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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
CINDY WILLIAMS, : Appellate Court No. 20070286 
Defendant/ Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction based upon a plea of guilty by the 
Defendant to the charge of Possession of a Controlled Substance within 1000 
feet of a Drug Free Zone, a class A misdemeanor and False Personal 
Information to a Police Officer, a class C misdemeanor. The plea of guilty was 
taken before the Honorable Parley R. Baldwin on the 19th day of March 2007. 
Jurisdiction for the Appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(e). 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT I 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HER GUILTY 
PLEA? 
PRESERVATION IN THE TRIAL COURT: This issue was preserved for 
appeal by the timely filing of a motion to withdraw her plea. (R. 029). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Court reviews "a trial court's denial of a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse-of-discretion standard." State v. 
Blair, 868 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993). The Court applies "the clearly erroneous 
standard for the trial court's findings of fact made in conjunction with that 
decision." State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999). "However, the 
ultimate question of whether the trial court strictly complied with constitutional 
and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a question of law that is 
reviewed for correctness." State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999) 
(See also State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Section 58-37-8(2) Prohibited Acts 
(a) It is unlawful: 
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(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was 
obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a 
practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, 
or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, 
room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly 
and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances 
in any of those locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or 
forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance. 
Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount 
is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled 
substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin 
from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce 
but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) 
subsequent to a conviction under Subsection (l)(a), that person shall be 
sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection 
(2). 
Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), 
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is 
guilty of a third degree felony. 
Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the 
exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as 
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in 
Subsection (2)(b), and if the conviction is with respect to controlled 
substances as listed in: 
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(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for 
an indeterminate term as provided by law, and: 
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a 
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; 
and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for 
an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run 
consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for 
an indeterminate term as provided by law, and the court shall 
additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of six months 
to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony. 
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (2)(h) who, in an 
offense not amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207: 
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having 
in his body any measurable amount of a controlled substance; and 
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a 
negligent manner, causing serious bodily injury as defined in 
Section 76-1-601 or the death of another, 
(h) A person who violates Subsection (2)(g) by having in his body: 
(i) a controlled substance classified under Schedule I, other than those 
described in Subsection (2)(h)(ii), or a controlled substance 
classified under Schedule II is guilty of a second degree felony; 
(ii) marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols, or equivalents described in 
Subsection 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(S) or (AA) is guilty of a third degree 
felony; or 
(iii) any controlled substance classified under Schedules III, IV, or V is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
Section 76-8-507 False Personal Information to Peace Officer. 
(1) A person commits a class C misdemeanor if, with intent of misleading a 
peace officer as to the person's identity, birth date, or place of residence, the 
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person knowingly gives a false name, birth date, or address to a peace officer in 
the lawful discharge of the peace officer's official duties. 
(2) A person commits a class A misdemeanor if, with the intent of leading a 
peace officer to believe that the person is another actual person, he gives the 
name, birth date, or address of another person to a peace officer acting in the 
lawful discharge of the peace officer's official duties. 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving 
a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; Rule 11(e) 
e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) If the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has 
knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, 
the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a 
speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront 
and cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the 
right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by 
entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the 
offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the 
prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those 
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elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an 
admission of all those elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is 
sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was actually 
committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is 
otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution 
has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of 
conviction; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum 
sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is 
entered, including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive 
sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any 
motion to withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the 
record or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has 
established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the 
contents of the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English 
language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to 
the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to 
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was originally charged in an information filed October 25, 
2006, with the offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance within 1000 feet 
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of a Drug Free Zone, a class A misdemeanor in violation of U.C.A. §58-37-8(2) 
and False Personal Infomiation to a Police Officer a class C misdemeanor in 
violation of U.C.A. §76-8-507 (R. 01-2). On November 16, 2006, the Defendant 
made an appearance before the Honorable Judge Parley R. Baldwin and entered 
a plea of guilty to the charges (R. 57/2-5). In exchange for the guilty plea, the 
State agreed to remain silent at sentencing. (R. 57/2) 
Prior to sentencing the Defendant filed a motion to withdraw her guilty 
plea. (R. 029). The basis for the request was because the police report was full 
of lies and she believed that Adult Parole and Probation ("AP&P") was part of 
the State and shouldn't be allowed to make a recommendation where the State 
had agreed to remain silent. (R. 029). 
On March 15, 2007, the Defendant appeared for sentencing. The Court 
denied her motion to withdraw the guilty plea and sentenced her to one year and 
ninety days in jail to be run concurrent with each other. (R. 56/3). The 
Defendant filed a notice of appeal on March 30, 2007. (R. 048) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Defendant was originally charged in an information filed October 25, 
2006, with the offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance within 1000 feet 
of a Drug Free Zone, a class A misdemeanor in violation of U.C.A. §58-37-8(2), 
and False Personal Information to a Police Officer, a class C misdemeanor in 
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violation of U.C.A. §76-8-507 (R. 01-2). Defense counsel worked out a plea 
negotiation wherein the "State" would remain silent at sentencing. (R. 056/2) 
The Defendant thereafter requested the court to allow her to withdraw her guilty 
plea on the basis that she did not believe that AP&P should be allowed to make 
a recommendation when the "State" had agreed to remain silent. The 
Defendant apparently understood the word "State" to include all employees of 
the executive branch of the State of Utah including the prosecution as well as the 
police. The Defendant therefore claims her plea was not voluntarily or 
knowingly made. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the Defendant knew, understood, and 
comprehended her rights when she entered her guilty plea. At the time that the 
Defendant entered her plea, she was under the impression that the state would 
remain silent at sentencing, and that the term "state" included all governmental 
entities, including the police. Although the trial court went through a complete 
Rule 11 colloquy, the Court failed to mention that the Judge is not bound by 
sentence recommendation and the term "State" only referred to the State 
Prosecutor. Because of this, the Defendant at that time could not understand the 
full terms of the plea negation. Only after reading through the pre-sentence 
report did the Defendant feel her guilty plea was entered into unknowingly and 
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mistakenly. The court did not inquire into the Defendant's ability to know and 
understand the Rule 11 recitation of right, and therefore the court failed to meet 
the requirement that the court insure that the Defendant knew and understood 
these rights. The court's subsequent denial of the Defendant's motion to 
withdraw her plea was therefore an abuse of discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HER GUILTY 
PLEA 
The Court in the case of State v. Blair, 868 P.2d 802? 805 (Utah 1993) 
held that the appellate court reviews "a trial court's denial of a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse-of-discretion standard." The Court has 
further noted that it applies "the clearly erroneous standard for the trial court's 
findings of fact made in conjunction with that decision." State v. Benvenuto, 983 
P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999) "However, the ultimate question of whether the trial 
court strictly complied with constitutional and procedural requirements for entry 
of a guilty plea is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness." State v. 
Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999) (See also State v. Thurman, 911 
P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996) 
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The trial court, therefore, must ensure that the Defendant's plea has 
strictly met all the requirements of Rule 11, as well as meeting all constitutional 
requirements. Any failure in the process requires the granting of a subsequent 
motion by the Defendant to withdraw her plea. A trial court abuses its 
discretion by failing to grant the motion to withdraw the plea when a Rule 11 
violation is present. In State v. Mora, 2003 UT App 117, ^ f 23 this Court held: 
We hold the trial court exceeded its discretion by denying Mora's 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court that accepted the 
plea failed to strictly comply with Rule 11 when it accepted 
Mora's guilty plea without correctly incorporating the affidavit 
into the record or establishing elsewhere on the record that Mora 
knew the State was required to prove him guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
The issue before the Court is whether the Defendant knowingly and 
voluntarily entered her plea. Rule 11 requires that the defendant enter that plea 
voluntarily and that the defendant know and understand each of the rights listed 
in Rule 11(e). Although the trial court made the finding that the Defendant 
voluntarily entered into the guilty plea, the court failed to explain to the 
Defendant that the term "state" did not include all executive branch agencies. 
The proper reviewing factors, pursuant to case law cited above, is whether 
the trial court "strictly complied with Rule 11." This strict compliance would 
include making a determination as to whether or not the Defendant knew and 
understood all of the rights described to her in the plea colloquy. 
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For a plea to be voluntarily and knowingly made, a "defendant must 
understand the nature and value of any promise made to him." State v. 
Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1274 (Utah 1988). If a defendant pleads guilty based 
on "an exaggerated belief in the benefits of his plea ... he should be allowed to 
withdraw his plea." State v. Norris, 2002 UT App 305, 1f 10, 57 P.3d 238 
(quoting Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1275). Pleas based on illusory or misleading 
promises generally will not be considered voluntary. See Copeland, 765 P.2d at 
1275. 
The Defendant, in the present case, did not fully understand the value (or 
lack thereof) of the plea agreement until she had read the pre-sentence report. 
The Defendant had an exaggerated belief in the benefits of her plea bargain. 
Those benefits were that the state would remain silent at sentencing. The 
Defendant was unaware that the "state" referred only to the State Prosecutor, 
and mistakenly believed that the "state" referred to all state agencies. Because 
Defendant's guilty plea was based on an exaggerated belief in the benefits of her 
plea she should be allowed to withdraw her plea. 
In the present case, the Defendant was under the impression that the term 
"state" referred to all state employees. It is clearly understandable for an 
individual to mistake the term "state" as including all executive agencies, 
including State Prosecutors, Adult Probation and Parole and the Police 
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Department. Failure to inform the Defendant of this substantial fact led to a 
misunderstanding of the plea agreement and thus to an involuntary plea. 
The United States Supreme Court has indicated that, "when a plea rests in 
any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can 
be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be 
fulfilled." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). 
The Defendant is cognizant of this Court's holding in State v. Thurston, 
781 P.2d 1296 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). While the holding may appear on its face 
to be controlling in this case, Defendant would assert that the issue in this case is 
a different issue altogether. In Thurston, the prosecutor agreed to recommend 
probation rather than incarceration. AP&P was directed to prepare a pre-
sentence report. The pre-sentence report included the investigating police 
officer's recommendation that the defendant should be sent to the Utah State 
Prison and the statement that "15 years is not long enough." Id. at 1298. 
This Court held that a prosecutor's agreement does not bind all state 
agencies. "We also find that sound public policy requires a plea agreement 
reached by a prosecutor not to be binding on other state agencies. The entire 
sentencing process is a search for truth and an evaluation of alternatives." Id. at 
1300. 
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The issue in this particular appeal is not whether the State breached its 
agreement when AP&P made sentencing recommendations to the trial court. 
The issue is whether Defendant's plea was voluntarily made when she believed 
that the agreement bound all state agencies from making recommendations 
including AP&P. 
The entry of a guilty plea involves the waiver of several important 
constitutional rights, including the privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront witnesses. 
Because the entry of such a plea constitutes such a waiver, and because the 
prosecution will generally be unable to show that it will suffer any significant 
prejudice if the plea is withdrawn, a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea should, in general, be liberally granted. State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040 
(Utah 1987) 
In the case at bar, the Defendant timely filed a motion to withdraw her 
plea. The Defendant unknowingly entered into the terms of the plea negotiation 
the day the plea was entered. The Defendant did not understand what was meant 
by the state remaining silent. As soon as the Defendant became aware that the 
term "state" only included the State Prosecutor, the Defendant filed a motion to 
withdraw her plea of guilty. Because the prosecution would not suffer any 
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significant prejudice by the withdrawal of the Defendant's guilty plea, this court 
should allow the Defendant to withdraw her plea. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant did not understand what it meant for the State to remain 
silent at sentencing. Based on this misunderstanding, Defendant had an 
exaggerated belief in the plea bargain and the plea was not voluntarily entered. 
Based on this, the Defendant respectfully requests this court reverse the trial 
court's denial of her motion to withdraw her plea, and remand for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this Ijo day of NovembeT2007 
DEE W. SMip i 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to 
Weber County Attorney's Office, 2380 Washington Boulevard, Second Floor, 
Ogden, Utah 84401, postage prepaid this lL> day of November 2007. 
DEE W. SMI 
Attorney at Law 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
CINDY WILLIAMS, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
APP SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 061904033 MO 
Judge: PARLEY R BALDWIN 
Date: March 15, 2007 
PRESENT 
Clerk: debbieg 
Prosecutor: DECARIA, MARK R 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s) : MICHAEL BOUWHUIS, PDA 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: July 5, 1957 
Video 
Tape Number: PRB031507 
MAR 1 9 200? 
Tape Count: 10:36-10:39 
CHARGES 
1. POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 11/16/2006 Guilty 
2. FALSE PERSONAL INFORMATION TO PO - Class C Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 11/16/2006 Guilty 
HEARING 
This is time set for sentencing. Defendant is present in custody 
and is represented by Michael Bouwhuis, public defender. Court 
denies the motion to withdraw the plea of guilty. Court proceeds 
with sentencing. 
CD19521167 
061904033 WILLIAMS, CINDY 
Page 1 
Case No: 061904033 
Date: Mar 15, 2007 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a 
term of 3 65 day(s) 
Based on the defendant's conviction of FALSE PERSONAL INFORMATION 
TO PO a Class C Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term 
of 90 day(s) 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
The Court gives credit from today's date and allows the jail time 
to run concurrent with each other. 
Date d this /Q day of - m O A ^ 
~k BALDWIN 
District Court Judge 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT 6F" WEBER COUNTY 
200] APR -h PM 3-- 5i* 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * + * * 
APR C 6 2G07 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
CINDY WILLIAMS, 
Defendant 
VIDEO TRANSCRIPT 
CASE NO. 061904033 
***** 
SENTENCING 
MARCH 15, 2 007 
JUDGE PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
***** 
APPEARANCES: 
FOR THE STATE: MR. MARK R. DECARIA 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: MR. MICHAEL BOUWHUIS 
*k ~k ~k ~y *k 
- FILED 
tnAHAPMELLAT: COURTS 
SEP 11« mj 
ORIGINAL 
Diane W. Flanagan, RPR 
801.395.1056 056 
2 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE CLERK: State of Utah versus Cindy Williams, 
061904033. This is time set for sentencing on page 1. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Cindy. 
THE COURT: Ms. Williams is present. This is the 
time set for sentencing. The Court has also received a 
motion to withdraw the plea of guilty. I have had a chance 
to review that. 
Mr. Bouwhuis? 
MR. BOUWHUIS: I would submit it based on the motion 
that was filed. 
THE COURT: Thank you. The motion is denied. The 
Court has had a chance to review, and I'm denying the motion 
to withdraw. 
Mr. DeCaria, do you want to be heard on the senrencing? 
MR. DECARIA: Let me just look here. No, Your 
Honor. We agreed to remain silent on sentencing. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Bouwhuis? 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Your Honor, I reviewed the report 
with her. She indicates that she — she is obviously in Salt 
Lake County Jail for that — her case there has got her going 
to the drug court, but this case would stand in the way of 
doing that. She has a drug problem. We would like to get 
that treatment through the drug court, and so she would like 
Diane W. Flanagan, RPR 
801.395.1056 
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to be able to do that. 
She indicates to me, and 1 -- I looked in the report 
here, and under the section that normally lists her custody 
status and time served, they -- I'm not sure what this is. 
This talks about some other issues but doesn't indicate how 
much time she spent. She tells me she spent 10 weeks in jail 
on this particular charge. 
And so what she's asking the Court to consider doing is 
giving -- giving her credit for the time that she's done. 
She would like to be then released to go do the drug court in 
Salt Lake City, and of course on probation impose any other 
conditions the Court feels would be appropriate in her case. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Bouwhuis. I've had a 
chance to review this and the letters, and I'm not willing to 
do that. 
Ms. William, it's the sentence of the Court that you 
spend one year in jail on count one of the information, 90 
days on count two. Those times may run concurrent. You'll 
be given credit for the time that you've been in the Weber 
County Jail. That concludes this case. 
(End of proceedings.) 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
I, DIANE W. FLANAGAN, RPR, Official Court Reporter 
in and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify that the 
foregoing is a true and correct transcription from the 
videotape recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled 
matter. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative or 
employee or attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor a 
relative or employee of such attorney or counsel, or 
financially interested directly or indirectly in this action. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and 
seal of office at Ogden, Utah, this 4th day of April, 2007. 
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